

IRAN

From Religious Dispute to Revolution

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*To the warm, courageous, and complex people of
Iran, and to my parents and our intellectual and
religious traditions*

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convinced him to change his mind. Bakhtiar reopened the airports. On January 31, there was a massive display of troops in Tehran, to warn Khomeyni supporters. On February 1, Khomeyni returned to a welcoming crowd of some two million people.

Negotiations went on. Bakhtiar retreated from his previous assertions that he would arrest any provisional government appointed by Khomeyni. Such a government could act as a shadow government only. Khomeyni thereupon named Bazargan as his prime minister designate. Khomeyni in turn retreated from his assertion that the referendum abolishing the monarchy had already passed in the streets and that he would present a new constitution. The 1905 constitution could provide a framework for transition. The military now began to negotiate with Khomeyni directly. Bakhtiar began introducing bills in parliament to fulfill the demands of the revolution: a bill to abolish SAVAK, a bill to establish jury trials for former corrupt officials, a bill to withdraw from CENTO; he continued the cancellation of expensive military contracts begun under the shah. Small demonstrations in support of Bakhtiar now began to be held. Bazargan told a rally on February 9 at the University of Tehran that strikes should continue until Bakhtiar resigned but that credit should be given Bakhtiar for freeing the press, easing the curfew, lifting bans on demonstrations, and freeing political prisoners.

On Friday night, February 9, and Saturday, February 10, the marxist and Islamic guerrilla groups, concerned by the notion of compromise with the shah's army, forced the issue by attacking two military bases.²⁶ On Sunday, the army withdrew its defense of the Bakhtiar government, declaring its neutrality in the political struggle. Bakhtiar went underground. Bazargan moved into the prime minister's offices.

The struggle to construct a new political system had begun. On the religious side the charismatic authority of Khomeyni and the conflict between middle-class, scholarly, and folk interpretations of Islam would become immediate issues. Khomeyni had allowed his followers to call him "Imam" Khomeyni. Newspapers and intellectuals now began to object that at most he was a Nayib al-Imam (aide of the Imam), hardly a messiah. In the fervor of the revolutionary struggle, even middle-class educated people voiced the interpretation that Khomeyni was the marja'-i taqlid of the era and therefore whatever he said to do must be done without question. Ayatullah Shariatmadari quietly reminded people on several occasions that Khomeyni was merely one of the learned men of Islam. The frequent tactical use Khomeyni had made of terms like *haram* and *jihad* also caused concern. Bakhtiar responded to Khomeyni's threats of jihad if he should not resign by pointing out that jihads were to be called only against non-Muslims, not against Muslim brothers. Khomeyni's labeling marches by leftists or other activities as haram or *didd-i shar'* (against the Islamic law) raised eyebrows and fears

of authoritarianism. Most of all, the exercise of power by a secretive committee around Khomeyni without informing the Bazargan government angered leftists, intellectuals, and Bazargan himself, who on March 1 threatened to resign.

One of the contradictions of the religious revolutionary movement had begun to be played out. During the past year university students had denied any contradiction between their two heroes, Khomeyni and Ali Shariati, between the granting of special authority to a marja'-i taqlid and denying such special authority but insisting instead that Muslims should democratically think for themselves. Indeed by the end of February the Islamic guerrilla organization, the Mujahidin, had become allied with the marxist Fida'iyyin against Khomeyni and his more authoritarian aides.

One interpretation of this contradiction from the point of view of a liberal Shariati supporter, is that an ideological revolution was part of the ferment and disruption of the past year. The interpretation is constructed partially from the logic of Shariati's writings but primarily from the defenses of the revolution offered by Muslim students in the United States in the days immediately following the installation of the Bazargan government.

Ideological Revolution

Two important ideological shifts occurred in the course of the revolution. First, it became practical to stress that the Karbala paradigm is not a passive weeping for Husayn but rather an active fighting for Husayn's ideals, and it is not merely a personal and individual commitment but a social one. Second, after the removal of the shah there was a shift from Husayn as the symbol of protest against tyranny to 'Ali as the symbol of constructive government and Muhammad as the symbol of universalism.

KARBALA IN THE ACTIVE MOOD

The insistence that the Karbala metaphor should trigger action rather than weeping is an old one. It served as a standard admonition in rawdas, especially during Ramadan, the month of commemorating 'Ali. It served as an objection of the more scholarly and the more middle-class Shi'ites to the lower-class folk religion and to the akhunds who catered to them. And it served as a slogan of the modernists such as Dr. Ali Shariati against the dry religion of the ulama. During the revolutionary year, the most striking illustration of the active interpretation of Karbala was the suspension of traditional mourning processions during Muharram and especially on 'Ashura: political marches were substituted.

Ayatullah Khomeyni's first speech upon returning to Iran was also illustrative. He spoke in the Behesht-e-Zahra Cemetery in South Tehran, where the Tehran martyrs of the revolution were buried. He spoke in Lot

number 17, to commemorate the seventeenth of Shahrivar (Black Friday). He began:

For the children who lost their fathers [of whom he was one], for the parents who lost their children [of whom he was one], I feel very sad. I cannot stand it. I cannot stand it . . . The shah destroyed everything and built big and beautiful cemeteries for us . . . Is it human rights [O American President, who kept talking about human rights and issuing statements of unconditional support for the shah] to say that when we want to name a government we get a cemetery full of people?

What magnificent possibilities for a rawda. But Khomeyni used none of the rhetorical cues for weeping, and no one wept. The form was totally different: it was a speech not a rawda. People listened intently and applauded once, when he said the revolution would continue until the Bakhtiar government was replaced by an Islamic one.

Partisans and participants claimed that the revolution was a purifying process. They meant that a catharsis and exposure of the shah's lies had been performed, that the spilling of blood had produced an indelible commitment, and that false interpretations of Islam by the ulama and the state had been laid to rest. A great deal was said during the revolution about disgracing the shah and his government (*rusva' i kishidan*): each time the shah or the government experienced a setback, it was commented on as a disgrace and exposure. It was self-reassurance that the shah was not invincible, that assertion of civil rights was not hopeless. A beautiful minor illustration of this growing confidence is the story of the little old woman on 'Id-i Fitr who reacted in terror to the chant "Death to the shah" but then returned to watch the demonstration when she saw that the soldiers were not going to shoot.

The theme of martyrdom was of course central to the revolution. Husayn is the martyr par excellence. His martyrdom, in the passive version of Karbala, provided an intercessor for ordinary mortals at the last judgment. In a more active interpretation, his martyrdom is the model for others to emulate: through struggle on the side of good one achieves heaven without need of any intercessor. Since martyrs are said to go to heaven, one need not mourn their deaths as one does those of ordinary people. The symbolism of martyrdom was thus omnipresent. Demonstrators wore white shrouds to symbolize their willingness to die. Wall graffiti proclaimed that those who died did the work of Husayn, those who fought did the work of Zaynab (she kept the survivors of Karbala together and maintained the message of Husayn until the fourth Imam had recovered and could assume the political leadership), and those who did not fight did the work of Yazid. Young men willing to die formed lines at the front of the demonstrations between the soldiers and the people. Banners at rallies included pictures of the latest male and female

martyrs. Stories were collected of soldiers who aided the revolution and died for it, such as the soldier who shot his officer in Jaleh Square on Black Friday and the soldier who was killed for giving his weapon to the students in the November 4-5 events leading to military rule. Two of the most treasured stories were set in Tabriz and Hamadan.

In Tabriz, it is said, an officer asked three hundred men how many of them were willing to shoot to kill if so ordered. About half the soldiers stepped forward. He then asked how many of these would shoot their own relatives. Perhaps a hundred stepped forward. Finally he asked how many would shoot their own parents, and sixty stepped forward. He then shot the sixty and himself.

In Hamadan on 'Ashura, it is said, twenty-two-year-old conscript Mohsen Mobashsher Kashani was on guard duty at a meeting of the governor-general, the local SAVAK chief, the local military law administrator, the chief of police, and three other officials. The governor-general told Kashani that they were about to interview a mulla, and instructed him that at a specified time he should enter the room and shoot the mulla. The soldier slipped out to a phone and warned the mulla to come ten minutes late to the meeting. At the assigned time, when the mulla was originally supposed to be in the meeting, Kashani burst into the room and opened fire, killing the governor-general and wounding several of the others. He was shot in turn. His father in Mashhad refused to come to Hamadan to claim the body and pay the bond of 15,000 toman (\$2000) required by the government as insurance that other members of the family would not become involved in revolutionary activity. (People commonly believed the ransom was a gruesome fee to pay for the bullets used by the government.) Instead, some ten thousand people escorted the body to an airplane to be flown to Mashhad. When the father met the body, he was told not to cry, for a martyr (*jida' n*) goes to heaven.

Most important, especially for the future, was the sense that the revolution was laying to rest the false interpretations of Islam of the past and that the interpretations pioneered by Shariati would provide the framework for a creative, open, progressive, and just society. In the past the state and many of the ulama had misused Islam for their own purposes: the justification of second-class status for minorities on the grounds of ritual impurity (*najis*), the stress on divisions between Shi'ites and Sunnis, the justification of excluding women from the vote and from participation in public affairs, the allegation that land reform had been opposed because of the sacredness of private property in Islam or because of the material interests of the ulama—all were condemned. Instead, it was argued, the true Muslim was one who contained in himself faith (*iman*), self-purification (*taqwa*), and practicality (*'amal-i salih*). The true Islamic society was one in which there was an organic relation

between the community (*ummat*) and the leadership (*imamat*), in which social cohesion reflected divine unity; hypocrites (*munafiqin*), especially materialists who used Islam as an opportunistic cover, were to be rejected. In this sense the Muslim guerrilla group, the Mujahidin-i Khalq, were a vanguard: they had already purified themselves several years earlier by purging marxists who had tried to infiltrate. They called themselves holy warriors (*mujahidin*), ones who struggle in the path of justice. Although they had split from Mehdi Bazargan's Movement for the Liberation of Iran over the use of force, which Bazargan rejected, in February 1979 they played a vanguard role in bringing Bazargan to power by helping precipitate, through armed struggle, the final fall of the Bakhtiari government. It was Iran, the revolutionaries felt, that would show the Islamic world the proper path to a just society.

GOVERNING IN THE MOLD OF 'ALI AND MUHAMMAD

The rapid inflation of religious titles after the revolution so that almost every senior mulla was called Ayatullah or Hojjat al-Islam was a benign overenthusiasm. But underneath this rhetorical euphoria lay the more important relation between mullas and political authority. Although for the National Front the revolution was almost complete and what remained was to allow the professionals and bourgeoisie to take control of the institutions of government, for Khomeyni the revolution would not be complete if essentially the same policies of the past were continued. For him the revolution was not merely a political or an economic one, but a moral one changing the tone and value orientation of the government and of social behavior.

Khomeyni did not have a Leninist revolutionary party with a disciplined cadre, nor did he have a clear program. He could only use his charisma, the rhetoric of a clarified Islam, occasionally the dogmatic style allowed old men, and tactics of intimidation to negotiate and pressure the various elements in society toward his vision of an Islamic moral society. It was to be expected that the dual sovereignty of a nominal government headed by Bazargan and an informally constituted series of revolutionary councils, largely manned and coordinated by mullas and backed by irregular revolutionary militia, would continue for some time in an uneasy, unstable, and tense relation to each other. The Bazargan government and the middle class, feeling insufficiently strong to confront or break with Khomeyni, awaited the decay of his charisma and the Islamic fervor as economic and administrative problems piled up. The Khomeyni forces, lacking clear organization or program, often relied on terror tactics adopted from the shah. The very name Revolutionary Committee was motivated by the Committee Prison, the most feared of the interrogation and torture centers under the shah: that the name was deliberate was made clear by the announcement that the head-

quarters of the Revolutionary Committee would be in the old Committee Prison. The names of the members as well as their deliberations remained secret. It was announced that a new secret police with a slightly modified acronym had been set up: SAVAMI. There was a running feud with the press over the acceptability of political criticism and over the management of the news.²⁷ There were crises over whether Khomeyni had the right to countermand administrative decisions of the Bazargan cabinet.²⁸ It became clear that Khomeyni had the authority to override the policies of the Bazargan government on such matters as summary executions and ethnic minorities. He did not, however, have the power to dismiss completely the political demands of the revolution for constitutional processes.

It is not surprising that for some time after the revolution the symbols and rhetoric of a clarified Islam should remain a potent tool in Khomeyni's hands, at least as long as he used them flexibly and strategically. *Hijab* (female modesty), justice, *jihad* for rural reconstruction, and unity (*awhid*) are all examples of redefining terms in an attempt to renegotiate the rules of society.

Ramadan 1979 (July-August), for instance, was used by Khomeyni as a symbolic tool against the Kurdish resistance to his unilateral decisions, against the criticism by the press and by Bazargan, and against the boycotts of the elections for an assembly to pass on his draft constitution by the National Front, the National Democratic Front of Matin-Daftari, Ayatullah Shariatmadari's Muslim People's Party, and leftists. He called for unity, redefining tawhid (unity of God in all his manifestations) so it not only included, but specifically denoted, national political unity and solidarity with all Muslims in the world. He called for the reinstitution of the khutba after Friday communal prayers and urged that everyone attend Friday prayers. As Ayatullah Taleghani explained in his khutba on the first Friday of Ramadan (July 27), which Bazargan attended, Shi'ites had more or less suspended the use of the khutba because the political leadership of the community had fallen into the hands of the *taqout* (oppressors, corrupters). The Friday assembly originally was intended by Muhammad for both worship and politics. Now that the taqout had been overthrown and replaced by a just and equitable imamate, the khutba should be reinstituted. Khomeyni asked that the preachers use the khutba to stress the need for unity within Iran and among all Muslims, both Shi'a and Sunni. He declared the last Friday of Ramadan, Jerusalem Day, in solidarity with the Muslim Arab struggle to recapture that city.

Although it is too early to tell how the new discourse of Shi'ism in Iran will develop, four issues dealt with in chapter 5 can be reexamined in a preliminary way: politics, Islamic economics, the status of women, and the position of minorities.

Politics. From the beginning the revolutionaries stressed constitu-

tionalism and the moral role of the ulama. As the movement gathered force, the call shifted from reinstating the 1905 constitution to underscoring more pointedly the illegality of the Pahlavi monarchy and its activities under the constitution, and finally to the need to reconstruct the political system. The 1905 constitution contained a provision for supervision over legislation by a council of five mujtahids. Ayatullah Khomeini proposed that he continue to exercise an analogous function for the new Islamic republic, but he would not participate directly in the new government and the provisional government that he would name would not contain any ulama. Ulama would have the right to run for parliament as individuals. The process of transition was to be a referendum on the monarchy, a constitutional convention to amend or rewrite the constitution and free elections.

An important part of the demand for constitutionalism was for reform of the judicial system to allow open trials, defense of the accused, and the protection of due process. A third promise of the revolution was political pluralism, decentralization, and increased regional and local autonomy. All three of these liberal goals—most clearly articulated by the National Front, given full support by Ayatullah Shariatmadari and apparently only tactical support by Ayatullah Khomeini—rested uneasily alongside the conservative interpretation of Islam articulated by Khomeini. This conservative vision denigrated democracy as mindless popularity contests, and contrasted the infallible wisdom of divine law. It valued swift and final justice over the celebration of due process, which allows escape to the guilty on technicalities. And it insisted on submission (islam), community (ummat), and correct actions expressed by a unified leadership (imamat), over any demands for autonomy or pluralism.

Thus, in December and January, Khomeini claimed that the referendum on the monarchy had essentially passed in the streets and that his advisors would present a constitution for the people's approval. This, together with his failure to consult with his allies in the National Front, with Mehdi Bazargan, or with Ayatullah Shariatmadari, throughout the course of the revolution, caused considerable fear of authoritarian tendencies. When the Bazargan government was installed, Khomeini retained a Revolutionary Committee, which in short order executed eight generals and then a traffic warden accused of setting the Abadan Rex Cinema fire (a charge few found credible), and another unknown man accused of being a torture expert. There were neither public trials nor consultation with the new government. Protest was heard from all sides: from Prime Minister Bazargan, from Ayatullah Qummi in Mashhad, from the International Commission of Jurists, from leftists. But Revolutionary Committee member Ayatullah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani replied that the executions would continue, for "we must purify;

we have to renew." The furor grew as people were executed for sexual offenses as well as crimes under the shah. Bazargan made a major speech on March 14 (by which time sixty-eight people had been executed), denouncing the executions as "irreligious, inhuman, and a disgrace to the country and revolution." Ayatullah Taleghani disassociated himself from the executions.

On March 15, former prime minister Hoveyda's trial began. Khomeini bowed to the outcry against the summary executions and halted the trial until a code of procedure could be established. The code he produced allowed him to appoint prosecutors, obligated sentences to be carried out within twenty-four hours, and denied the need to provide criminals with lawyers. Hoveyda's trial resumed, and he was executed on April 7. Trials became slightly more public: witnesses were called against the accused, and the accused was allowed to speak in his own defense (though Hoveyda was denied his request to prepare a full statement of defense). In early May, Khomeini announced that executions were to be limited to persons proven to have killed people, or issued orders for killing, or committed torture resulting in death. But executions continued for sexual deviance, pornography, prostitution, political dissent (in the case of the Kurds), and even for contact with Israel (in the case of a prominent Jewish businessman). By the end of August 1979 over five hundred people had been executed. Ayatullah Sadegh Khalkhali ran for election to the constitutional convention proudly claiming to be personally responsible for condemning two hundred to death (the electorate rejected him).

At issue was the authority of the Bazargan government, revolutionary retribution (spokesmen justified the executions by pointing out that many more people had died in other revolutions), and judicial rights and procedures. One of Khomeini's first directives upon return to Iran was to the Minister of Justice that decisions should be swift and final and there should be no appeal processes in either civil or criminal cases. He repeated a number of times that criminals had no right to lawyers. In part, he was reacting to the interested slowness in the Pahlavi regime's administration of justice which allowed graft. In part, the executions were motivated by a fear that the military officers and secret police personnel might promote a coup. And certainly there was indignation as stories of torture under the shah were publicized. But Khomeini's lack of concern for deliberation, his blindness to the possibility of error, and his simple faith in swift justice were not reassuring.

Other areas in which Khomeini was able to override the wishes of the Bazargan government were, first of all, the exercise of power through the loosely coordinated, or even uncoordinated, activities of the Revolutionary Committee and the numerous local revolutionary committees which began to spring up, instead of through the public government; second, the reliance on the irregular revolutionary militias instead of

reconstructing the army and absorbing the irregulars into it²⁹; and third, negotiation with the ethnic minorities. Although Ayatullah Taleghani on behalf of the government had repeatedly expressed willingness to negotiate the demands of these minorities, and although the Bazargan government was opposed to the use of force to decide these issues, Ayatullah Khomeini refused to consider the demands legitimate and insisted on defining their expression as treason against the state to be crushed militarily.

Even in the progress toward a constitution Khomeini bucked the demands of the other factions of the revolution. A basic promise of the revolution had been political pluralism and local autonomy. A leitmotif of the year had been the separation of identity of the different allied factions. By spring 1978, Marxist demonstrations had been distinguished from those of the bazaar and of Islamic partisans. The need for the National Front to ally itself with Khomeini was underlined by Khomeini's ability to veto any compromise negotiations between the shah and Sanjabi and by the failure of Sadeghi and even of Bakhtiari to shake that National Front stance. But in January 1979, when victory was almost assured, the National Front and Khomeini called separate marches to protest against the Bakhtiari government. Earlier, in the fall, the oil workers pointedly refused to obey commands from Khomeini and had to be cajoled by Bazargan. About the same time factory workers said they would not return to work merely on the demand of Khomeini unless their political demands for free unions were agreed to. So, when Khomeini returned to Iran and his Revolutionary Committee began to exercise power, the left warned that no single faction should be allowed to monopolize the revolution. This stand was given support by various groups protesting the arbitrary appointment of bosses without consultation with the workers: the National Iranian Radio and Television workers objected to the appointment of Khomeini aide Ghotbzadeh as their chief; workers in the oil fields demanded a say in management decisions; objections were voiced to a number of police and military appointments; workers in various factories and organizations formed their own management committees.

There was considerable pressure on Khomeini to accede to a referendum, and it was held on March 30. Ayatullah Shariatmadari, the National Front, and the leftists, however, all protested the manner in which it was formulated. One had only a choice of voting for an as yet undefined Islamic republic (with a green ballot, the color of Islam), or against (with a red ballot, the color of Yazid). Kurds, Turkomen, and numerous others announced a boycott of the referendum. To counter a possible low turnout, the voting age was lowered from eighteen to sixteen to enfranchise the youths who had helped man the street demonstrations. On April 1, Khomeini declared an Islamic Republic and the first day of a government of God.

The next step was to provide a new constitution. Shariatmadari, the National Front, and leftists demanded a constitutional convention. Khomeini and his aides preferred to publish a constitution themselves. After repeated postponements, a draft was leaked to the press at the end of May, looking very much like the 1905 constitution.³⁰ On August 3, an election was held for a seventy-three-member Assembly of Experts to approve or amend the draft before putting it to a general referendum. This election was boycotted by Shariatmadari, the National Front, and the National Democratic Front on the grounds that the criteria for candidacy were restrictive (of 417 candidates, 383 were mullahs), that there was not enough time to campaign, and that political meetings were harassed and disrupted by Khomeini followers. The opening of the Assembly on August 19 was overshadowed by demonstrations against new restrictions on the press promulgated by the Ministry of National Guidance, and by the use of the army to drive Kurdish dissidents from the major towns of Kurdistan.

The Assembly of Experts (*majlis khabrigan*) redrafted the constitution, placing all aspects of government under clerical guidance. In the preamble the failure of the constitutional movement of 1905 and the nationalist movement of 1952-53 were attributed to a lack of proper Islamic philosophy. The new movement was dated, coincidentally with Khomeini's political career, from 1963. The *marja-i taqlid* or *na'ib ul-Imam* of the moment—initially Khomeini—was empowered to preside over the selection of the president of the republic, to dismiss him in concert with the supreme court or the parliament, to appoint the supreme judiciary, to act as supreme commander of the armed forces, to declare war and peace, and to appoint six clerics to a twelve-member Council of Guardians which could veto parliamentary legislation deemed contrary to Islam and which would select the successor or council of successors to Khomeini. Exactly how the various checks and balances between the *na'ib ul-Imam*, the legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government, the Council of Guardians, and the Assembly of Experts (which could be convened to change the constitution or remove the *na'ib ul-Imam* or council of leadership should they become incapacitated) would work remained unclear.

Objections to this form of instituting the *wilayat-i faqih* were voiced in vain by members of the Assembly of Experts such as Ayatullah Naser Makarem and the Azarbaijani lawyer Rahmatullah Moghaddam-Maragheh (one of four civilians in the Assembly); by members of the government such as Prime Minister Bazargan and Azatullah Sahabi (also a member of Bazargan's Movement for the Liberation of Iran); and by Ayatullah Shariatmadari. Shariatmadari insisted that because the notion of *wilayat-i faqih* was ambiguous and disputed in Islamic jurisprudence—some interpreting it as merely moral guidance, or even more narrowly as financial guardianship for children and for the mentally in-

competent; others, like Khomeini, interpreting it as political activism—it should not be incorporated into a constitution. He was among those who argued that institutionalization of the *wilayat-i faqih* contradicted the constitutional article vesting sovereignty in the people.

On the anniversary of the Black Friday massacre at Jaleh Square, Ayatullah Taleghani, who had received the largest number of votes in the elections for the Assembly of Experts but had been outmaneuvered for its presidency by Ayatullahs Montazari and Beheshti (the latter, head of Khomeini's Islamic Republican Party), spoke at the Beheshti-e Zarah cemetery, warning Iranians to avoid despotism masquerading as religion. It was against Islam, he reminded his listeners, to deprive people of the right to criticize, to protest, and to express grievances. A few days later, on September 9, he died. He had long argued in behalf of democratic local councils; to honor his memory—or to avoid protests in his name—local councils were hurriedly organized a month after his death in provincial towns.

Behind Taleghani's warnings lay not only the struggle over the constitution but also clerical demands to purge the oil fields, the civil service, and the army. The irregular militias or revolutionary guard (*pasdaran*) were gradually organized under Ayatullah Lahouti and under Minister of Defense Mustafa Chamran, a Berkeley-educated activist who had spent time in Lebanon and was considered to be a leader of the so-called Amal group that had participated in Shi'ite struggles in Lebanon. Revolutionary guards were scrutinized by members of Khomeini's Islamic Republican Party before being recruited; eventually, in December 1979, Lahouti resigned, charging that the guards were becoming an arm of the Party. Ayatullah Khomeini's son-in-law, Shahabuddin Eshraqi, led a campaign against Hasan Nazih, the human rights activist lawyer and ally of Bazargan who had been made head of the national oil company. The campaign began in early June, with charges by Revolutionary Council members Mohammad Beheshti and Mohammad Mofatteh that Nazih had criticized Khomeini and therefore should be removed. One benevolent theory had it that Nazih was maneuvering to run for President of the new republic as the candidate of Shariatmadari's Moslem People's Republican Party, and that Khomeini contenders wished to see him sidelined. By September 28 Nazih had been removed by order of Khomeini and forced underground. He was charged with refusing to purge the labor force, refusing to remove major pay differentials between white- and blue-collar workers, and giving financial support to newspapers critical of the regime. Nazih responded with detailed refutations of the charges; he demanded a public investigation by a panel including Khomeini and Bazargan. The prosecution quietly dropped the case, and Ahmad Khomeini, the Ayatullah's son, telephoned Mrs. Nazih with expressions of sympathy.

The campaign against Nazih was but one of a series of struggles that

attempted to silence moderate, critical, or independent voices. In April, Ayatullah Taleghani had gone underground for three days after two of his sons and a daughter-in-law were arrested. The Mujahidin declared their willingness to fight at his direction, but he met with Khomeini and drew back from any challenge. His critical voice was essentially silenced or muted until the final week of his life. At the same time, in mid-April, Sanjabi resigned as Foreign Minister in an attempt by the Bazargan government to dramatize its protest against interference by the Revolutionary Council. Council member Ibrahim Yazdi replaced him. Hedayatullah Matin-Daftari was driven underground in the summer. Bazargan attempted to disprove criticism that the government was insufficiently revolutionary by nationalizing a number of banks, companies, and industries in early summer; toward the end of July he announced the gradual merging of the secret Revolutionary Council with the public government. But by September, Mohammad Beheshti, who had become the de facto head of the Assembly of Experts, and Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr were again calling for Bazargan's ouster, complaining among other things that he refused to purge the civil service.

What was occurring during the course of 1979 was quite clearly a second phase of the revolution, fitting very nicely Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution*: the collapse of the *ancien regime* is followed by a period of dual sovereignty, with a public government and a secret power structure; a terror in which over six hundred executions occurred; and a series of crises in which moderates were increasingly neutralized. Bazargan's resignation, along with that of Foreign Minister Yazdi, ending the period of dual sovereignty, came on November 6th in the drama surrounding Muharram 1979 (see Epilogue).

Economics. Just as there were fears about the ambiguity of the nature of an Islamic constitutional government (*mashruti*, "constitution," from *shari*, "condition," implying conditioned by the Qur'an), so too there was considerable speculation about what Islam would mean for the economy. Ayatullah Shariatmadari tried to allay fears in January 1979 by saying that not all interest was usury, that the future government would need international technical help, and that international banks with their interest rates would be welcome. But Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr, an economist who seemed to be close to Khomeini, issued an economic program that called for abolishing all interest, nationalizing banks, canceling all international debts owed by Iran, establishing workers' committees to run all public enterprises (such as the oil industry, the banks, and the media), lowering oil production and raising oil prices, and introducing high taxes on imported industrial goods to stimulate domestic industry. Another major set of demands, much discussed in broad non-specific terms and incorporated into the platform of the National Democratic Front, called for redistribution of wealth and a new land reform.

The call to abolish interest received much attention in the Islamic

world. Kuwait in particular moved to establish modern banking facilities on a significant scale which avoided interest calculations and operated on a profit- and risk-sharing basis. The calls for worker participation in management had been present among various groups in the revolution since the summer of 1978. University professors threw out their administrators and elected their own deans and department chairmen. After the revolution, secret committees were established in some of the universities, and these conducted the hiring and firing procedures. Workers in the oil fields demanded a say in production and export strategies. In January 1979 various workers' committees were set up in the news agencies, at the airport, and at other places.

Perhaps the most interesting expression of Islamic economics during the revolution were the cooperative organizations set up to support the strikes, to feed the poor, and to organize relief. This first became evident on a large scale perhaps at the time of the Tabas earthquake. Relief was organized by Ayatullah Shirazi in Mashhad, and television coverage played up the contrast between the inefficiency of the government relief and the efficiency of the religious network. The *pièce de résistance* was the television coverage of the peasant who turned to the queen and told her not to come merely to look at their suffering but to grab a shovel and do something useful. In Tehran, merchants and the religious network organized to subsidize food and to support people who had no income either because they were impoverished or because they were on strike. Most important, the critical oil strike was supported by donations throughout the country, with professionally printed receipts being given to donors. Granted that the revolutionary enthusiasm helped maintain these networks, nonetheless cooperation was demonstrated to be a viable organizational tool. So much for the ideology of the shah that the people had to have everything done for them. Once again the shah was exposed.

Economic issues after the revolution took second place to political reorganization. Oil production was initiated, but while revenues came in, there was little ability to infuse the money into the domestic economy. Production levels were lowered to roughly three million barrels per day as compared with nearly six million barrels before the revolution, but as world oil prices continued to rise, Iranian government receipts did not suffer. In addition, Iran expanded the number of customers from about ten to about forty companies. Banks, insurance, and a number of industrial enterprises were nationalized in June and July. In December, Bani-Sadr, now Finance Minister, announced the amalgamation of banks into eight national banks, seven divided functionally (housing, mining, agriculture, and so on) and a provincial bank, divided according to province and incorporating the former Bank Sadarat, the most aggressive commercial bank with a wide network of local branches. These Islamic banks, it was announced, would no longer charge interest on

loans, but only a fixed 4 percent fee. Wages were raised for workers and lowered for management. Credits were provided for farmers. But the revolutionary economic policy remained unclear.

Peasants and sedentary tribal farmers in Fars, in Turkoman country near Gorgan, in Shahsavan country near Ardebil, in villages near Tehran, and in Kurdistan thought the revolution meant a new land redistribution; they seized lands they thought had been taken from them unjustly and resisted landlords who attempted to recover their property. The ulama protested. Khomeini told the Turkomen that irrigated lands previously owned by a number of the shah's generals should now belong to the community at large (*bait-ul-mal*). Shariatmadari issued a similar fatwa against the Shahsavad seizure of the Dashi-e Moghan irrigation project. Ayatullah Dastgheeb issued similar opinions in the Shiraz area. The Ministry of Agriculture announced that the Dez Irrigation Project in Khuzistan would be sold to private persons rather than restored to the thousands of families evicted from the land. On the other hand, when the Mujahidin interpreted the Qur'anic verses on the spoils of war (*Sura Anfahl*) as support for public or collective property in pursuit of a classless society (*jama'i tawhid*) and said that this should apply to mines, forests, and other national resources as well as to land seized from the shah's retainers, they were condemned as marxists illegitimately manipulating Islamic terminology. Mines and forests belong to the discoverer, as long as he pays Islamic taxes.

A basic problem in the industrial sector and the cities was that of getting people back to work. Revolutionary committees were set up to aid management in a number of firms, and many of those who had jobs considered their lot improved, despite high inflation, low productivity, and shortages. A new spirit of proletarian—or ascetic Islamic—austerity reigned in some of the largest firms, where managers received salaries considerably smaller than those of their predecessors, occupied smaller offices, and replaced fancy hand-woven carpets with machine-made floor coverings in emulation of Khomeini's simple life style. But many did not have jobs. On April 11 the unemployed demonstrated in Isfahan, Abadan, and Tehran. In Tehran, failing to gain satisfaction from the Ministry of Labor, a thousand people marched to the home of Ayatullah Taleghani. During the summer of 1979 Khomeini called for a jihad for rural reconstruction, asking urban dwellers to go into the villages and volunteer help to the peasants. When those who did so—either following the jihad or simply returning to aid their families' seasonal labor need—returned in the fall, they again swelled the ranks of the unemployed. On October 1 and 2, 1,500 demonstrated, chanting "death to this fascist regime" and "death to the Islamic republic." On November 12 there was a major demonstration of some thousand people at the Ministry of Labor.

Women. That women participated in all aspects of the revolution is evidence that it was a genuine social movement; it is not necessarily evidence that their position would be improved after the revolution. In Algeria women were full partners in a revolution whose ideology was explicit equality of the sexes; yet afterward women were again reduced to a traditional role. The religious leadership of the Iranian revolution stressed the liberal interpretation cited in chapter 5: women are not prevented from participating fully in the public sphere: they can vote and hold any office; but they should not be used as sex objects divorced from conjugal and family obligations as ways of selling and packaging the commerce of the West, which is a form of sexual exploitation and neocolonial domination. Occasionally there were reactionary statements: in the open parliamentary days of early September 1978 a member from Minab, Heydarzadeh, joined what he thought was the religious bandwagon by proposing a law revoking the gains women had made under the Family Protection Laws, only to find himself roundly abused by women members. In order to allay the fears of otherwise sympathetic progressives, Khomeini appointed a female physician as one of a committee of five to represent him in Washington in January 1979. She appeared on American television to speak for the revolution, her hair covered with a modernistic headcloth. But upon his return to Iran, one of Khomeini's first instructions to the new Minister of Justice was to review the Family Protection Law and strike out what was against Islam. He then caused an uproar by saying that women must not work "naked" in the government ministries, widely interpreted as an order that women work in chadors, and indeed there were cases of revolutionary militia turning women away from their offices until they came in chadors.

On March 8, International Women's Day, some ten thousand women marched from the University of Tehran to the prime minister's office; three thousand went by bus to Qum. Heard during the march were cries of "Down with Khomeini," "Down with this dictatorship." Khomeini retreated, saying that he had meant only that it was a personal duty of devout Muslim women to wear the veil, not an order to be enforced by the state. The veil, he said, was to be honored as the flag of the revolution, but anyone insulting women in the name of the revolution should be punished. On March 10, a second march was held to the ministry of justice. Although protected by male friends, this time there were ugly clashes with foul-mouthed, knife- and broken-bottle-wielding men. At issue in the marches was not only women's rights, but also the values of democracy the middle class had fought for during the revolution. People were protesting Khomeini's insistence that the referendum on the Islamic republic be a yes/no vote, without any chance to indicate support for a secular republic or other form of government than one under his guidance. They were supported in this by Ayatullah Shariatmadari.

Although anti-Khomeini sentiment was building, marches were abruptly canceled on the grounds that the revolution was too fragile to be split. The women's issue gradually sank into the background, and on the birthday of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet—May 17—declared Iranian Women's Day, a march of some ten thousand veiled women was held, with men segregated, but with some veiled women carrying rifles.

Khomeini suggested bans on coeducation, on music, on the practice of males and females swimming together or mingling in public gatherings such as political marches. All these remained open to negotiation. Marches were segregated, but women continued to be seen without veils, although progressive activists wore headcloths, and the ban on music was ignored.

Minorities. Because the 1905 constitution had made second-class citizens of non-Ja'fari Shi'ites (in the sense that they could not become cabinet ministers or judges) and because it contained provisions confining freedom of press and education to things that were not harmful in Islam, there was a good deal of concern over what a more fully Islamic interpretation of the constitution might bring. Minorities had participated in the National Front movement of the 1940s and felt considerable solidarity with the political and social goals of the revolution, but they were uneasy about fighting for those goals in Islamic rather than secular terms. During the winter of 1978, handbills and wall graffiti calling for the death of Zoroastrians, Jews, Assyrians, and Armenians evoked fearful memories of the religious riots of the turn of the century.

The position of Bahais remained a concern throughout. Sadarat bank branches were regular targets of demonstrators on the grounds that the bank was Bahai controlled; there was the riot after 'Ashura in Shiraz; Khomeini repeatedly refused to acknowledge any rights of Bahais, although he said Jews and Christians would be protected. The double slander on American television by Dr. Mansur Farhang, a defender of the revolution, that hostility to Bahais was understandable because they had been recruited in great numbers into SAVAK and had been trained in Israel did not help. On July 12, 1979, the Bahai temple in Tehran and other Bahai property were seized, and the temple was given to Alama Nuri to turn into an Islamic institute. In September the house of the Bab in Shiraz, a major Bahai shrine, was destroyed. Graveyards in Yazd and other towns were desecrated, corpses exhumed and burned. A total of sixteen shrines and historical sites were confiscated or destroyed, graveyards in at least nine towns were bulldozed or desecrated, and homes in over a score of villages were burned or looted.

And yet the revolution was remarkably protective of minorities. Jews were extremely nervous because of Khomeini's anti-Zionist rhetoric and Israel's participation in the creation of SAVAK was constantly played up and given as the main reason oil to Israel would be cut off, whereas

Israeli development aid in the Qazvin plain, the poultry industry, and elsewhere was never mentioned. Five to ten thousand of the eighty thousand Iranian Jews left the country during the turmoil, many hoping to return. Of the majority who stayed, a few were active in the movement. The November 5 riot in Tehran which swept down Shah Reza and Ferdowsi streets, destroying Armenian liquor stores, passed by the solid row of Jewish carpet shops, leaving them untouched.

Jews worried again when Ayatullah Khomeyni and Ayatullah Taleghani both repeated the absurd demagoguery that Iranian soldiers would not shoot their Muslim brothers and that it had been Israeli soldiers who had fired on the crowd at Jaleh Square. A Jewish delegation went to Qum to prevent a contribution to the movement by Ayatullah Shariatmadari. Another delegation was received in Paris by Ayatullah Khomeyni. Both ayatullahs said Jews would be protected. During the bloody riots a Jewish hospital in Tehran became a center of blood donations and transfusions for the wounded. When Khomeyni returned to Iran, a Jewish delegation was present to welcome him. After the Bazargan government was installed, four Jewish leaders in Tehran held a news conference in which they announced solidarity with the revolution, that they expected but would overlook minor incidents of discrimination, that they were cutting all ties to international Jewish organizations, and that they felt themselves to be first and foremost Iranians. This same group, eventually calling itself the Society of Intellectual Jews, held a memorial service after the assassination of Professor — and since the revolution, Ayatullah — Mortaza Motahhari, a leader of the Revolutionary Committee, and expressed again solidarity with the revolution.

Nonetheless, on May 9, 1979, in an extraordinary warning to the Jewish community, the prominent businessman and Jewish community leader Habib Elghanian, was executed by a revolutionary court. The crime was "contact with Israel and Zionism." One of the rumors floated among New York's Iranian students was that he had been killed in revenge for Motahhari's assassination, because only an Israeli agent could have killed such a central figure in the revolution — this despite the fact that Motahhari's death was claimed by the Forghani guerrilla group, and despite the fact that a Jewish delegation which had visited Khomeyni after Motahhari's assassination had been promised again that Jews were protected. Two months later a Jewish businessman was killed in Isfahan by an anonymous assassin allegedly in retaliation for Israeli raids on Lebanon.

Christians too were promised protection by Khomeyni. At the time of the November 5 riot, the Armenian bishop issued a statement that the destruction of Armenian liquor stores was anti-liquor, not anti-Armenian. During 'Ashura a Christian contingent marched chanting:

Din-i ma masihi'st

Rahbar-i ma Khomeyni'st

Our religion is Christianity,

Our leader is Khomeyni.

At Khomeyni's request, electricity blackouts were suspended at Christmas and New Year's so that Christians could celebrate. For the Armenian Christmas in January, the Armenian archbishop announced that public festivities would be suspended in solidarity with the revolution. A priest in Shiraz was slain early in the revolution, and in October 1979 there was an attempt on the life of Anglican Bishop Hasan Dehghani-Tafti (a convert many years ago from Islam). Shaykhi leader, Abdul Reza Ibrahim, was assassinated in Kirman in December 1979. Shaykhis are a sect within Twelver Shi'ite Islam which has common nineteenth-century roots with Babism and Bahaism.

Ismailis (members of a non-Twelver but Shi'ite branch of Islam), like Jews, were anxious: the leadership in Mashhad involved itself in the movement, but Ismaili villagers, like many Muslim villagers, remained faithful to a king who had protected them against the excesses of the mullas or remained simply bewildered by the events. Zoroastrians also were frightened and anxious. Shortly after the installation of the Bazargan government, some guerrillas walked into the main Tehran fire temple, removed the portrait of the Prophet Zoroaster, and replaced it with one of Khomeyni. That, commented an old Zoroastrian woman, was going too far. Sunni minorities also expressed doubts, and in their case the issue was also compounded by ethnic and linguistic issues.

Despite much speculation during 1978 about the potential for the ethnic minorities to attempt to break away from the central government, ethnic divisions did not become an actual political issue until the spring of 1979, when the Kurds, the Turkomans, the Arabs of Khuzistan, and the Baluch began to assert their linguistic differences and make administrative demands. And once again the religious boundary proved critical. Kurdish Sunnis armed themselves during the course of the revolution and, while supporting its goals, demanded autonomous status within an Iranian federation. They worried that Khomeyni always spoke of Iran as a Shi'ite state, never acknowledging that there were Sunnis as well; and they spoke bitterly of past humiliations when they had gone to Tehran or to other Shi'ite parts of Iran and were caught, for instance, performing the namaz differently. But there was more to their demands than this. The Pahlavis, in the interest of national integration, had discouraged the use of Turkish, Arabic, and Baluchi in the schools and as a medium of literary production. For similar reasons, the Pahlavis had also systematically throughout Iran appointed governors, heads of bureaucratic offices, and military personnel to serve in areas where they had no local ties. In spring 1979, first the Kurds, then the Turkomans, Arabs, and Baluch, demanded a reversal of these policies. They wanted

the right to teach and use their own language, to appoint their own civil and military officials, and to have a larger say over regional development plans. This became one of the first major struggles for Khomeyni, who, like the Pahlavis, preferred a unitary state over any form of federation.

Interestingly, the Azerbaijanis — previously the most vocal of the opponents of the Pahlavis' linguistic policy — were not visibly involved. In part the explanation for their relative silence may be that they were represented in the revolution by Bazargan (although his Turkish language skills are minimal), Taleghani (although his home village has its own distinctive dialect and is on the linguistic border between Turkish and Persian speakers), and Shariatmadari. None of these exercised central power, but all three clearly were jockeying for position. In part the explanation may also be that they are Shi'ite, and not Sunni as are the Kurds, Turkomans, and Baluch. Karim Sanjabi, a Kurd, was nationally important but he is not only an upper-class Tehrani, far removed from the concerns of Kurdish villagers, he also is a Shi'ite.

From the movement's point of view, minorities ought to have no fears. The model is 'Ali. 'Ali dealt justly with minorities. He rebuked 'Umar for adjudicating a case against a Jew just because the other party was a Muslim, and he rebuked 'Umar for being discourteous to a Jew in court, even though the Jew's case was weak. A few of the revolutionaries point out that Jews experienced a period of intellectual glory in Muslim Spain and were better off there than under Christianity. The case might be stronger if they could also claim that minorities were better off under Islam than under the secular modern West. That is a challenge for the revolution to live up to.

A New Era

Four times previously — in 1873, 1891, 1905-1911, and 1952 — religious and liberal-reformist groups had joined in alliance and forced a major government policy reversal or a major change in the form of government. Four times, as soon as the immediate objective was achieved the alliance unraveled. The question in 1979 is not only whether the alliance can hold but, more important, whether a liberal civil order can be established. Two of the previous efforts — 1906 and 1952 — can be seen as attempts at a bourgeois revolution, with intellectual leadership coming largely from secular liberals. In the 1978 effort religious leaders — especially Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeyni, but also Ayatollahs Mohammad-Kazem Shariatmadari and Mahmud Taleghani and Engineer Mehdi Bazargan — played the key roles. This was not a regressive atavism of religious fundamentalism; nor was there any failure of liberal imagination. Rather, it is argued, Islam could play a unifying political role because the monarchical dictatorship of the 1930s-1940s and the 1960s-1970s had suppressed all other forms of political debate

and organization. A variety of divergent interests therefore expressed themselves through the Islamic idiom. The question now is not only whether the use of the Islamic idiom will decay but whether the progressive promise of Islam can be fulfilled.

If 1979 proves to be a turning point for Iranian Shi'ism, a "translation" of Shi'ism will be involved. Over the past decades Shi'ism has been crafted into a powerful moral platform for criticizing the diseases of the Pahlavi regime: the intimidation by the secret police, the massive corruption at the top of society, the destruction of agriculture, the punitive price-regulation campaigns against the bazaar, the misuses of the talents of the middle class, the subordination of Iranian development to outside imperialist interests, and the separation of the monarchy from accountability and responsiveness to its own people. Today Shi'ite leaders have the opportunity to translate their moral opposition and social criticism into a framework for modern politics. Issues such as the nature of politics and economics, the position of women, and the rights of religious, linguistic, and cultural minorities take on new relevance. It has been well said that the Western revolutionary tradition stresses individual freedom, sometimes at the expense of economic justice, that the Eastern (Communist) revolutionary tradition stresses economic justice at the expense of freedom, and that the Shi'ite promise is one of combining freedom and justice. We wish the Iranian people well in their attempt to reach for that promise.