

The Venture of Islam



Conscience and History
in a World Civilization

MARSHALL G. S. HODGSON

VOLUME THREE

THE GUNPOWDER EMPIRES
AND MODERN TIMES

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have been before, and the resistance was repressed with censorship and violence.

Under 'Abdülhamid, Christian peasants had often enough been brutally treated. Since 1905, there had been massacres of Armenians in particular (who were accused of taking their new liberties under the Constitution too seriously), often by their Kurdish enemies. But within the Muslim and especially the upper urban classes, 'Abdülhamid's most serious weapons had usually been imprisonment or exile. The Young Turks were eager to assure security to all, in the abstract, and were shocked at the massacres of Armenians (which recurred in a brief uprising against the Young Turks' Modernism); but they introduced political violence within the ruling group, condemning political opponents to death. This tendency was only strengthened when, from 1911 on, Turkey found itself almost continuously at war to defend what remained of its territories.

In fact, the retirement of 'Abdülhamid had provoked an international assault on the empire—perhaps on the expectation that this might be the last chance; the Young Turks were too hard pressed to show what they might have been capable of in peace. Austria-Hungary annexed the fragment of Balkan territory it had been administering. Worse, Italy, in 1911, undertook to conquer the remaining Ottoman territories on the coast west of Egypt. The Turks were quickly driven out, and the unyielding Muslim resistance had to be carried on locally by the *Sanusi* *tarîqah*, ensconced in its deserts. Finally, the Balkan states combined to drive the Turks out of their peninsula, leaving them by 1913 only a short stretch of land back of Istanbul (the Albanians having seized the opportunity to proclaim independence). Then in 1914 the Young Turks allowed the Germans, with whom they were increasingly allied for commercial and developmental purposes, to drag them into the war with Russia—and hence with Britain and France. There was little leisure or surplus of resources for reforms.

But in the midst of this turmoil there had been much public consideration of future possibilities. One of the best known of the writers on policy was Ziya Gökalp, who rejected the idea of an Ottoman nation as in its nature unsound. He had been deeply influenced by the French sociologists and evolved, on their bases, his own interpretation of the Turkish situation. Humanity is articulated into nations, apart from which human beings are scarcely human. Each nation has its own folk culture: its own common memories and customs, its own aspirations expressed in folk stories and in popular songs. These are intimately connected with its language, and therefore the speakers of a given language (normally in a given area) can be expected to form a nation. Any such nation, then, may be associated with other nations in a wider civilization on the level of technique and the various specialized arts: on the level of courtly literature, of political forms, of legal and large-scale institutional structures. But such civilizations are incidental to the nation itself: it can adopt them at one time, cast them off

or change them at another. The Turkish nation had adopted the Perso-Arabic or Islamic civilization long ago, when that was the most advanced in the world; now it could turn and adopt the Occidental civilization instead without changing the basic character of its nationhood. Indeed, that national life could be fully expressed only through the most advanced civilization possible; and it would not be possible to adopt Western civilization except as a nation with its own distinctive folk culture.

Ziya Gökalp was much concerned for religion, and like other liberals he came to feel that Islam, truly interpreted, was not necessarily bound up with the old Perso-Arabic tradition but could be carried by the Turks into their new civilization as another faith alongside Catholicism or Protestantism in western Europe. In line with the revival of literature at the end of the nineteenth century, he tried to write poetry expressive of the national sentiments, which should be in sufficiently popular form and language to win people's hearts and form their spirit.

Ziya Gökalp best formulated and popularized, then, against Ottomanist or pan-Islamic ideas, the idea of a strictly Turkish and Westernizing nationalism, which indeed he tended to conceive in terms not of all the Turkish peoples but of those of Anatolia and Thrace, as having a closer common folk heritage. But his ideas remained somewhat academic. Among the Muslim folk to whom he wanted to appeal, pan-Islamism had the greatest appeal, so far as any programme for a Modern national basis appealed to them at all. Among the official classes, Ottomanism seemed the only practical approach. Unlike the Greeks or Armenians, the ruling Turks did not consider themselves a nation, an ethnic group apart, but simply the leading class among Ottoman Muslims generally. The educated Turks did not identify themselves with the Turkish peasants or herdsmen, on whom they looked down as uncouth (the very word Turk, reserved for these latter, was rather an insult term). That a Turkist nationalism, such as that preached by Gökalp emerged sharply as the exclusive ideal of the leading Turks, was due to circumstances which unfolded in and after the First World War.

Forging the western Turkish nation

In the First World War, the Russians were kept busy on the German and Austro-Hungarian fronts, and as Bulgaria was allied with Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, there was no renewal of the land threat to Istanbul as in 1878. Except for a time on the northeast frontier, the serious enemy was Britain, with its navy and its base in Egypt. The Young Turks hoped to liberate Egypt across Sinai while Britain was preoccupied in the west, but their resources were inadequate, despite active help from the Germans. The British navy was then charged with landing in the Thracian straits—in the Dardanelles—so as to move directly on Istanbul itself. The officer charged with the land defence, co-operating with German naval units, was Mustafa

Kemal, later known as Atatürk. Mustafa Kemal became a national hero by successfully forcing the British to withdraw. Jealous, the leader of the Young Turks (Enver Pasha) sent Kemal to the less prominent northeastern front, where he held off the Russians. (In 1917, when the Russian revolution broke out, it was, as it happened, on this frontier, that the Turks found it possible to re-occupy territory which had been taken by the Russians long before.) Elsewhere the Turks more or less held their own, till finally, in 1918, the British in their turn crossed Sinai, aided by revolting Arabs, and drove the Turkish armies back north through Syria. The defeat was threatening to become a rout when Kemal was put in charge of the beaten armies. He kept them intact and helped ensure that when a truce was signed the Turks still had an active army in being. By the end of the war the Ottoman Turks had a renewed sense of common experience, in which the Anatolian peasant soldiers received a share of recognition. They also had a common hero.

Nevertheless, at the end of 1918, when Ottoman resistance ceased, the capital was occupied by French and British troops, while the territories of the empire were being divided among the French, British, Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Italians, and the revolting Arabs. Only parts of northern Anatolia and Istanbul—which revolutionary Russia was in no position to claim—were left to the sultan. The chief Young Turks were either taken or they fled (Enver Pasha fled ultimately to the Turkic lands of Russia in a fruitless attempt to raise a pan-Turanian state).

From the Greek viewpoint, this was the time to restore to Greek rule all the Aegean basin and its hinterland, which had not only been Greek historically but which still had a numerous Greek population: including Macedonia and Thrace to the north, and the western part of Anatolia. As the Greek forces proceeded from Izmir to occupy western Anatolia, raising the local Greek population to a mastery which often resulted in massacres of local Turks, many established Turks looked to a British or an American protectorate to save them from a worse submersion under the Christian minorities; but many of those having less to lose went into guerilla action. As this point, Mustafa Kemal defied the submissive sultan and assumed command in the heart of Anatolia of all those Turks willing to resist the victorious Allies. He called a Grand National Assembly to replace the parliament in Istanbul. The Assembly spoke effectively for the established classes of the nation, and he was able to control it by his incisive determination.

The sultan declared Kemal a rebel and (heedless of the Greek threat) sent such troops as he still had, supplemented by bands of Muslims loyal to him as caliph, against the resisters. Meanwhile with Allied help, the Armenians were trying to make good their own state in the formerly Russian and Turkish territories in the eastern highlands; the French were occupying their sphere north and northeast of Syria. The Kurdish republic, however, was still-born; Kemal expressed his gratification at the secession of the Arabs; the Italians had not yet landed in their allotted sphere in the southwest; and

Kemal did not yet attack the British, who were either at a distance in the Iraq and Palestine, or established at the capital itself. Even so, he was pressing four wars at once. The 'armies of the caliphate', despite initial successes, were routed by the new patriotic spirit in the countryside; the Armenians (who had been further decimated by massacres during the war of 1914) were pushed back to the former Russian frontier, behind which they retained a miniature republic; the French were convinced, after meeting desperate resistance, that Arab northern Syria was the most they should annex. Against the enemy best supported and most determined, the Greeks, there was a long holding action. Supplies and ammunition were collected or made in whatever manner came to hand, peasant women carried ammunition on their heads over the mountains, even the aristocrats at Istanbul proved their solidarity by winking at thefts from the Allied depots. At last, Kemal's lieutenant, İnönü, launched a massive assault. By the end of 1922 the Greeks had been driven back to Izmir (amid massacres, in turn, of Greeks by Turks) and into the sea. As the victorious Turkish troops approached the Straits, the British yielded and the sultan went into exile. Kemal reclaimed eastern Thrace, but made no major attempt to reverse the settlement of 1913 in the Balkans. A new peace treaty not only cleared the remaining territory of foreign troops but did away with all the apparatus of Occidental privilege, intervention, and control which had grown up in the nineteenth century.

For his successes, the Grand National Assembly accorded Kemal the title 'ghâzi', warrior for Islam. This Kemal accepted, at least for a time. But he insisted whenever possible that the victory was to be interpreted in a national rather than a communal religious sense. On his return to Ankara from the first great successes against the Greeks, religious leaders of the town urged him to come with them and offer thanks for victory at the tomb of the local saint. This would have been a matter of course for earlier Ottoman captains, and moreover the nationalist cause needed the support of the religious class against the claims of the sultan at Istanbul. But he refused them with insults, telling them it was the soldiers that had won the victory, and not their saint, whose cult should in no way profit.

Partly by the prestige he had gained in the War of 1914, but chiefly by his success against the Christian Greeks, when he had replaced the sultan in leading so spectacular a recovery after defeat, Kemal was undisputed master of the new nation he had helped call into being. In the wars of resistance, Turks had learned to feel themselves first of all Turks. Kemal now adopted uncompromisingly the Turkist ideal of which Ziya Gökalp was the most articulate spokesman. His success had been based largely on a deliberate abandonment of the Arab provinces; what he chose to reconquer was only that part of the empire in which Turks formed at least the best-placed part of the population, and preferably the majority of it. He had succeeded by relying on the sense of a common west Turkish fate that was shared among the Turkish-speaking common people: that is, precisely the

(west) Turkish folk of which Gök-Alp spoke. Kemal made peace with the Allies on the basis of a west Turkish nationality, though indeed he tried to include as much Kurdish territory as possible (in a Turkish environment, Kurdish families on the rise tended to be Turkified); the new boundary lines were drawn, in principle, on the basis of language, to which religious allegiance was assimilated. In particular, the two peoples, Greeks and Turks, which had been intermingled on both sides of the Aegean and had both claimed the whole area, partitioned the area between them so as to establish territorial national states. This arrangement was confirmed with a massive exchange of population: Greeks (that is, Christians owning the Greek church, who usually—but not always—spoke Greek) living in what was to be Turkey (except in Istanbul) were to be sent to what was to be Greece, while Turks (that is, Muslims, usually Turkish-speaking) living in what was to be Greece (except in western Thrace) were to be sent to what was to be Turkey. Kemal's own home town, Salonika, was left to Greece; but Izmir, which had been chiefly Greek-speaking, became a purely Turkish city.

The Kemalist republic: secularism and Westernism

Having established an independent Turkish nationality in a limited area, Kemal proceeded to take that nationality into the Occidental civilization. The Grand National Assembly was as much a product of the struggle as was the Turkish national consciousness; Kemal pointed out that in proclaiming it sovereign a republic had been proclaimed, the fact was accepted, and no sultan was installed. For a time the pan-Islamic fiction of a caliphate separate from the abolished sultanate was retained, but in 1924 this too was eliminated. Gradually, Islam was disestablished and made a private matter (though the state still held some of the purse strings). All the *tariqah* orders were abolished and their properties seized—many *khânagâhs* were turned into museums, as were a few mosques (though most mosques were allowed to remain open and attracted large numbers); *madrasah* colleges were closed, and the state-supported training of 'ulamâ' scholars ceased; the government-controlled system of waqf endowments became a secular matter. Above all, all traces of Shari'ah law were officially eliminated by the wholesale adoption of European law codes, in particular the Swiss personal law with only slight modifications.

Islam, to be sure, remained, but chiefly as woven into the character of the Turkish folk. On this level, even Kemal, unbeliever as he was, was loyal to the Muslim community as such. Kemal would not let a Muslim-born girl be married to an infidel. Especially in the early years (as was illustrated in the transfer of populations with Greece) being a Turk was still defined more by religion than by language: Greek-speaking Muslims were Turks (and indeed they wrote their Greek with the Turkish letters) and Turkish-speaking Christians were Greeks (they wrote their Turkish with Greek letters).

Though language was the ultimate criterion of the community, the folk-religion was so important that it might outweigh even language in determining basic cultural allegiance, within a local context.

Muṣṭafa Kemal set about, so far as law could carry, example could prevail, and the choice of economic investments could undergird it, to make Turkey a Western nation. Kemal's primary instrument in his work was the Republican People's Party, which he founded, whose membership rolls he controlled, and which alone could make effective nominations for the Grand National Assembly. It was more than an electoral device; it was a society for propagating the reforms. One of its most effective labours was to establish 'people's houses' (*halk evleri*) throughout the land, which served as community centres, libraries, and adult education schools, popularizing the new ways.

The party's principles, ultimately embodied in the constitution of the Republic, were summed up in six words. Republicanism, the principle of an elective, constitutional government; nationalism, basing that government on cultivation of a specifically national culture and loyalty; populism, recognition of the dignity and needs of the common people as its first concern; *âdâtism*, the responsibility of the state to establish and maintain economic prosperity; laicism, rejection of any communal religious privilege; and finally revolutionism (or reformism), the continuing adoption of the new and better at the expense of the merely traditional.

Populism implied not only universal adult suffrage; but equal rights, political and economic, for women; and mass education, pushed steadily and with cumulative (if not immediately fully successful) effect in widespread village schools. It implied at the same time a special care for the peasant. One of the most drastic reforms was the abolition of the old land tax on the crops, which had inevitably been exacted in a way that bore heavily on the peasants, even though it had been reduced already in the nineteenth century. (Since it was given a Shar'î form, it was necessary for Kemal to reassure the peasants that its abolition would not excite God's wrath; when this was assured, it was acknowledged as a blessing which doubtless compensated largely for the unpopularity of Kemal's other reforms.) The state's revenues were derived instead from state monopolies and indirect taxes, which weighed far less on the poorer peasants. The concentration of much land in relatively few wealthy hands, however, was only slowly attacked by the party, whose original support in Anatolia had been largely from the gentry. As to the working class in the cities, it was small and given few privileges by Kemal.

Étatism was adopted somewhat later than the other principles, though it followed naturally enough from the Turkish actualities, where such capital as had been present in the country had been controlled by non-Muslims, many of whom had left and the rest of whom were little trusted. Already the Young Turks had succeeded in multiplying the number of Turkish-owned factories, and despite their hostility to Istanbul as a half-foreign city, the

Kemalists succeeded in greatly multiplying that new number in turn. But the larger investments had to come from the state, which had reason to want to keep the pattern of investment under its control.

In the planning of education, including adult education, in the establishment and application of law, the same for all faiths, in the encouragement of the mechanization of agriculture, in the establishment of industries, the Kemalists tried to make Turkey Modern; and the Modernity they sought was clearly to be based on the traditions of what Kemal called 'the whole civilized world', whose good opinion alone he cared for, the West. The Turkish nation was to drop the Perso-Arabic and adopt the Occidental civilization. At two points this became especially clear.

It was in 1925, immediately after the Kemalists had suppressed a revolt of Kurds in the eastern provinces which had been staged in the name of Islam (in suppressing the revolt Kemal had taken the occasion to have executed a number of leaders among those Turks who opposed his policies), that he introduced some of his most drastic reforms, including the suppression of the *ṭariqahs*. However, that which roused the greatest outcry and the largest number of riots was the introduction of the Occidental brimmed hat. Men were forbidden by law to wear either the *fez* of Mahmūd or any other brimless headdress. Since in performing the *ṣalāt* men kept their headdresses on, a common feature of all Islamic headdresses was that they had no brim which would keep the forehead from touching the ground in the *ṣalāt*. Accordingly, the hat law outlawed at once all the various turbans, caps, and other headcoverings which had continued to distinguish many of the different groupings in the Ottoman empire, notably the '*ulamā'*' and the adherents of the diverse *ṭariqahs*; for the *fez* had been adopted only by certain urban classes, apart from the officials.

The act served, then, several functions at once. It symbolized the rejection of the Perso-Arabic and the adoption of the Western heritage (in itself the brimmed hat was not particularly Modern—for instance, it was not particularly efficient—but it was very explicitly Occidental). More substantively, it carried Mahmūd's reform further, abolishing for the whole population the old distinctions of status which headdress had marked and which were incompatible with the interchangeable homogeneity which a Modern nation-state presupposes; and it particularly reduced the visibility of those religious classes whose prestige and influence Kemal had to eliminate if the secular Republic were to survive. Finally, it served as a psychological *coup*. Even in language, 'the hatted man' had meant a European, and 'to put on a hat' had, as a phrase, meant 'to Europeanize'—that is, 'to desert Islam, or the state' (which came to the same). Kemal was demanding, in effect, that every Turkish man own himself a traitor to all that the Ottoman state had stood for. It was one of those blows which forces people to come to an inner decision: either they must resist now, or acknowledge defeat and henceforth hold their peace. Those most so minded did resist and were crushed; the

rest now had overtly to admit Kemal's authority, if not his wisdom, and found themselves implicitly committed to whatever more might be implied in Westernization.

Accordingly, when in 1928 a still more substantial symbolic gesture was made, overt resistance was minimal. It was decreed that henceforth the Occidental letters should be used for writing Turkish, and printing in the old letters was forbidden. The new alphabet was, indeed, phonetically clear and much more appropriate to Turkish than was the Perso-Arabic alphabet as then used. The writing system of Turkish had become chaotic and a real handicap to quick mass education. Yet the Perso-Arabic letters were, in principle, readily adaptable to any Modern needs: a few changes in type font could have made them as clear and efficient as the Modern Occidental letters. The Ottoman spelling was confusing but no worse than the English, and a reform in orthography (such as several Occidental lands were undertaking) could have done, in principle, all the simplifying that the new alphabet did. What the new alphabet did achieve was twofold: it ensured that the reform should be psychologically complete and irreversible; and that the younger generation should be abruptly cut off from all the printed books then in the libraries—from the Ottoman literary heritage.

Other moves toward language reform supplemented these effects. By the end of the nineteenth century, liberal Turkish authors had been simplifying the courtly Ottoman language, to write in a less Persianized Turkish, more like that spoken by ordinary people. This tendency now was implemented systematically. Not Ottoman but Turkish was to be the language of the new Turkish Republic; Turkish, the speech of the enduring folk, so far as possible restored to what it was before ever the Turkish nation adopted the Perso-Arabic civilization. Superfluous Persianisms—which were more numerous and more alienly handled than ever Latinisms in English—could be swept away simply by inspiring a spirit of straightforward simplicity. But the Turks wanted to eliminate the Perso-Arabic technical terms also, especially when they were little understood by the less literate, and launched a campaign for genuinely Turkish terms analogous to that of the Germans for Germanizing their words. They searched out available expressions, and roots on which new terms could be constructed, surveying all Turkish dialects past and present. Here the reformers were not fully successful although they did materially alter the vocabulary.

So far as possible, indeed, even the technical terms of civilization, which were relevant to the specialized callings of an international society rather than to the culture of a folk, were rendered through Turkish roots, which in many cases, at least, made them easier for ordinary people to learn when they needed them. But in this realm it was only natural, by the standards established by Ziya Gökalp, that the languages of the new civilized heritage be drawn on as had been formerly those of the old. Hence often French and Gallicized Latin were drawn on to replace Persian and Persianized Arabic.

The net effect, of course, was to assure permanence to the temporary effect of the change of alphabet. Younger Turks can no longer readily follow the vocabulary of the old literature even if it is transcribed into the new letters.

Especially following the world-wide depression of 1929, Kemal did his best to industrialize the country, partly so as to make it somewhat less dependent on imports from abroad, perhaps as much so as to create in Turkey the same institutions as prevailed in Occidental lands: which meant (whether this was recognized or not) the same economic classes and therefore interests, points of view, and habits of life, such as industrialization was bound to bring. He succeeded at least in ensuring the Modern industrial complex a position in Turkish life. The increase in industrial production in Turkey in his time was small absolutely, but relatively it came third after that in Russia and Japan, which led the world in rate of increase. But another institution of the Modern Occident was more crucial to introduce and still more difficult: the guarantees for individual freedom and for public criticism of official policy which can be afforded by a recognized, independent, but responsible political opposition. More than once, Kemal tolerated or even encouraged a party in opposition to his Republicans; each time he soon had to suppress it. The popular pressure to restore the old Ottoman-Islamic ways proved still too overwhelming and too violent: an opposition party was seized on by the masses as a means to undo the Republic itself.

By the time Kemal Atatürk died in 1938, however, his principles, 'Kemalism', were well established among the great majority of the educated youth, the only people capable of carrying on the Modern institutions in terms of which Turkey was actually functioning, and necessarily the carriers of whatever high cultural heritage Turkey was to have. Under his leadership, Turkey had resolutely answered the question, what does it mean to come to terms with Modernity, in a form which completely identified Modernization and Westernization: to become Modern was to join the West as one nation among other Western nations, sharing unreservedly in whatever was Western, for better or for worse. It was characteristic that a Turkish youth, writing as a member of an organization of young Europeans looking to greater European unity, could question whether the insular British were entitled to be included within the European fellowship. When, after the Second World War, the Turks showed themselves so eager to join the several new European organizations, such as NATO, it was perhaps as much to assure themselves that their cherished new identity was recognized as to gain economic and military advantages.

The survival of Islam

The religious conscience as such took little part in the drive for Modernization. The official stance of the Atatürk Modernizers was that religion should be Westernized like everything else. The state should be a 'lay' institution,

of course, and religion a private matter of the individual conscience. This much was achieved by the disestablishment of Islam. But it was hoped further that modern citizens would take a 'Western' attitude to Islam; that is, that Islamic piety would take on the social and emotional features of modern Catholic and perhaps especially Protestant or Reform Jewish piety. To some degree the state intervened in this sense. The state continued to appoint imāms and muezzins to the mosques, as before; hence it was in a position to require that the call to ṣalāt worship be made in Turkish rather than in Arabic. This meant at once a declaration of national independence from 'foreign' religious traditions, and an assertion of 'modern' rationality; for it meant an explicit breach with the Sharī'ah even in the realm of worship, in favour of direct intelligibility of the words to the public. At least in the immediate presence of official bodies, this was done; but very few Muslims seem to have accepted the Turkish substitute phrases as the true equivalent of the Arabic. (Much later, when permission was given to revert to the Arabic, the Turkish words disappeared.) There were individuals who suggested an extensive reform of the surface of religious life, in the hope that a different pattern of surface behaviour would contribute to a new inner point of view more in harmony with the new Western status of Turkey: mosques should have pews installed, where a congregation would listen to good Islamic preaching rather than focusing on the out-of-date bodily exercises of the ṣalāt worship; but such notions were never taken seriously. Islam found its own way essentially in separation from anything that was happening on the level of the state: not only did it not directly contribute to the Westernization, it was not seriously Westernized itself.

It was Islam that was to become the test case, then, of what was to happen to the whole traditional heritage under Westernization. There was a Westernizing class, which carried the reforms and imposed them on the surface of public life. There was also a Modernized sector of life everywhere, represented in the schools. The public schools presented a rigorous Modernism, strictly nationalist in outlook, and admitting a minimal recognition of Islam as an element in the Turkish heritage. The public school teacher became the chief representative, among the lower-class and rural parts of the population, of the new standards. He and the Modern physician and the party bureaucrats, with their links to the big cities and the government, were not to be ignored. But they commonly felt themselves isolated. Even decades after the reforms, at least in a small village, the public school teacher could find himself in a losing rivalry with the local preacher or imām, and carried on something of a contest to see whether the village children would, consistently with the law, follow his courses and accept his training in modern life, or whether they would in fact pay greater attention and respect to the Qur'ān school and its implicitly anti-modern, anti-state viewpoint.

Islam was markedly changed by the process of Modernization, but not necessarily in the manner that the modernizers anticipated. The public

activities of the *ṭarīqah* orders had been banned and identification with them prohibited, whereas the official worship at the mosque continued essentially as before under state patronage. With seeming reason, it was the relatively rational, sober Shar'ī cult that was favoured (with its long tradition of accommodation to the state), while the more unpredictable and personal aspects of Islam, never wholly at ease with any official propriety, were distrusted: the *imām* of the mosque could be assimilated to, say, a Lutheran preacher, while the wandering *darvīsh*, in an age when even the members of Catholic mendicant orders no longer actually wandered about the countryside, was obviously 'medieval' and 'oriental', a scandal to Turkey's Modernity. But even Sharī'ah-minded Islam could not be trusted by men who wanted to make over the nation's legal and social pattern on a Western secular basis; hence the suppression of the *madrasah* colleges seemed necessary in the hope that as the present generation died out there would prove no further need for Shar'ī training as the younger generation was emancipated from such norms. A good preacher need not know obsolete high jurisprudence nor even antiquated *kalām* disputation. But in fact the prestige of the *imām* had rested not merely on his governmental position and his ability to threaten the masses with the pains of hell; it had rested very largely on his 'ilm knowledge, on his long and difficult intellectual training, which only a *madrasah* college could effectively provide. As no new trained men appeared to take over the leadership of Sharī'ah-minded Islam in the mosques the authority of what was regarded as the relatively sober and dependable aspect of Islam declined. Meanwhile a mere suppression of outward forms was much less effective against the *Ṣūfī* *ṭarīqahs*. Outward displays could be eliminated, or even any formal organization into *ṭarīqah* orders. But there was no way to prevent a *ṭarīq* from conversing with his friends and their children in the privacy of his home; and this was all that was needed to carry on the mystical tradition. There was little reason for the authority of the *Ṣūfī* aspect of Islam to decline among those who took religion at all seriously.

In fact, it seems that a great part of the population did not see Atatürk and his reforms as hostile to Islam as such. The suppression of the *madrasah* colleges did not affect most people directly, but chiefly only a hitherto privileged element most of whom preferred to turn to modernizing schools anyway. The suppression of the *ṭarīqah* orders could be felt as a blow not against *Ṣūfism* but against the corrupt pretenders to *Ṣūfism* who made such public display of their piety. For, as in many societies, even people who were very pious and expressed their piety by turning to all the established claimants to pious status still were inclined to be sceptical of any given holy man, of any given *darvīsh* or *ṭarīq*; they might feel that a general suppression of all *ṭarīqahs* was rather drastic, but would have to admit it was not without cause in these 'latter degenerate days', and might regard it as a gesture toward purifying Islam, though in a different sense from Atatürk. Atatürk

himself continued to be accorded very generally the title of *ghāzī*—of victor in the *jihād* holy war for Islam against the infidel Greeks. Such religious people might be ill disposed toward Atatürk's reforms generally, but they would not see them as any direct threat to religion (unless, possibly, in such an immediately effective detail as the wearing of a brimmed hat in which the *ṣalāt* worship could not be performed); they would be inclined to resist the trend privately, waiting till times changed again.

In this atmosphere, though Sharī'ah-minded Islam withered, *Ṣūfī* Islam could be reaffirmed and perhaps even strengthened spiritually. One member of the radical Bektāshī *ṭarīqah* wrote a well-known book to claim that the revolution was fulfilling the egalitarian and freethinking aims which the Bektāshīs had had all along, so that there was now no longer any need for a separate Bektāshī organization; but most Bektāshīs will hardly have agreed. The Mevlevīs, always largely upper-class in appeal and so on relatively easy terms with the Modernizers, and little concerned for the Sharī'ah law anyway, were little troubled by the authorities. Their chief religious centre, the tomb of Jalāluddīn Rūmī and of his chief successors at Konya, was turned into a museum where tourists could gaze at the relics of *darvīsh* piety under state auspices. But the Mevlevīs continued their technically illegal ceremonies in private, including the distinctive dance, and trained up their youth even though in reduced numbers (so that years after Atatürk's death, when it was desired to reproduce the Mevlevī ceremony at the museum as an attraction to the growingly important tourist trade, the difficult dance was performed perfectly by numerous young men). Indeed, the museum at Konya still functioned as a shrine to the surrounding population, to pilgrims who visited it, and even to the museum guards themselves, whose republican emblems did not prevent them from worshipful enthusiasm if those in attendance seemed at all sympathetic. *Ṭarīqahs* like the Qādiriyyah and the Naqshbandiyyah, more closely associated with Shar'ī rigour and a sense of social propriety in the old Islamicate sense, were less tolerantly treated, but their traditions remained fully alive. When, after the War of 1939-45, greater freedom for religious expression was allowed, the vitality of Islam seemed to lie chiefly on the *Ṣūfī* side; the old *ṭarīqahs* proved very attractive, at least in the form of personal cultivation, even among many of the class which in other ways had wholeheartedly accepted Atatürk's reforms, and new *ṭarīqahs* arose and became very popular even though still illegal.

But Islam was not simply disciplined by secluded *ṭarīqs* instead of by public *madrasahs*. As the formally trained 'ulamā' scholars died out, popular Islam tended to lose any consistent discipline at all. It could become difficult to distinguish religious superstition from serious religious concern. Ordinary people displayed their respect for the Arabic letters by hanging sacred formulas written in Arabic as charms or talismans on buses or taxis. Though a civil ceremony in the state courts was recognized as essential to a marriage

(except in the far eastern part of the republic, where the mountaineers largely ignored this requirement), the real wedding, indispensable to a proper married state, was felt to be that arranged by the imâm, however ignorant he might be even of Shar'î rules. After the War of 1939 even the devotees of Atatürk saw that it was necessary to reopen formal Shar'î training so as to bring the power of religion under more rational control.

The great public question, after the war, turned out increasingly to be what should be done with Islam. A *farîqah* order which in the Maghrib, where it originated, had been conservative, even pro-French, became, on arrival in Turkey, a spearhead for a religious drive to undo the work of Atatürk. Such a religious drive was less strong than some feared, yet it was tacitly, and even sometimes overtly, the most emotionally laden issue between political parties even though all parties agreed in theory to maintain Atatürk's secularism. In any case, secularism, despite the distance it set between the state and the religious establishments, had in no way introduced the Modern Western conception of religious liberty, in which any form of religious faith could be tolerated without fear. So soon as the Shar'îah-minded were allowed to establish formal religious training again and regain a recognized voice, it became clear that they took it for granted that the religious forms that they might expect to be tolerated should be just those that were tolerated under the Ottoman régime. If a *tarîqah* order paid respect to the Shar'îah, its suppression was simply a question of state policy. But some, at least, took it for granted that the many Shi'is of the republic, most of whom were sufficiently Bâtinî in orientation not to respect any Shar'îah, Shi'î or Sunnî, could never be granted religious toleration, not because they were dangerous to the state, but because their doctrines on the point of Shar'îah were incorrect. Eventually one of the most active points of debate became just the question of religious liberty, which neither Atatürk's state nor the Şûfî leadership had made familiar to the bulk of the population, though religious liberty might prove essential to any real spiritual growth which would accommodate the practical culture of the modernizing classes to the spiritual demands recognized even by a large section of the Modernized classes and felt as fundamental by a large part of the population.

The operation of shifting from one heritage to another was not so complete or so unequivocal as it might appear. Even in nationalist consciousness, the Occidental agrarianistic past, for instance, had not really supplanted the Islamicate agrarianistic past, which remained (for one thing) the field in which past Turkish greatness stands out. Nor was it easy to divorce the Muslim religion, as a private spiritual exercise, from the great civilization which had formed around it. The masterpieces of Muslim spirituality are at the same time the masterpieces of the Perso-Arabic literary heritage. It was often found that those persons who took most seriously a personal spiritual cultivation might also cultivate a conscious and considered rejection

at least of the cultural aspects of Kemalism. Many Kemalist Turks have hoped that a truly vital Turkish 'Reformation' of Islam might come, which would free it from the more extraneous elements of the older heritage and make Islam not only a Modern but a fully Western religion. Such questions touched the point in the heart of human beings where any cultural life must face its most critical test.

At times, Atatürk's solution might have seemed tentative or superficial, at best. Many Kemalist Turks were horrified to see occasional crude expressions of a popular reaction against Westernization: as when an approving mob in 1930 watched its leader first shoot and behead an officer who tried to interfere with an anti-government demonstration, and then display the severed head in the streets. But the Kemalists themselves indulged in a display of communal bigotry during the war, when Nazi German power was at its height: a capital levy was decreed, the chief provisions of which applied explicitly to non-Muslim businessmen (including foreigners, however, only if they were Jewish subjects of Germany or its allies). It was administered with no provision for appeals or review, in such a manner as to ruin them and often imprison them at hard labour, as an added penalty for their Christian or Jewish status. As German power receded, the prisoners were released.